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ABSTRACT
This survey reviews the growing use of patent data in economic analysis.
After describing some of the main characteristics of patents and patent data,
it focuses on the use of patents as an indicator of technological change.
Cross-sectional and time-series studies of the relationship of patents to R&D
expenditures are reviewed, as well as scattered estimates of the distribution
of patent values and the value of patent rights, the latter being based on
recent analyses of European patent renewal data. Time-series trends of patents
granted in the U.S. are examined and their decline in the 1970s is found to be
an artifact of the budget stringencies at the Patent Office. The longer run
downward trend in patents per R&D dollar is interpreted not as an indication of
diminishing returns but rather as a reflection of the changing meaning of such
data over time. The conclusion is reached that, in spite of many difficulties






Cambridge, MA 02138Overheard at a Catskills Resort
(one guest to another):
--The food is so terrible here.
--Yes.Andtheportions are so small.
1. Introduction
Patents and patent statistics have fascinated economists for a long time.
Questions about sources of economic growth, the rate of technological change,
the competitive position of different firms and countries, the dynamismof
alternative industrial structures and arrangements all tend to revolve around
notions of differential inventiveness: What has happened to the "underlying"
rate of technical and scientific progress? How has it changed over time and
across industries and national boundaries? We have, in fact, have almost no
good measures on any of this and are thus reduced to pure speculation or to
the use of various, only distantly related, "residual" measures and other
proxies. In this desert of data patent statistics loom up as a mirageof
wonderful plentitude and objectivity. They are available; they are by
definition related to inventiveness, and they are based on what appears to be
an objective and only slowly changing standard. No wonder that the ideathat
1something interesting might be learned from such data tends to be rediscovered
in each generation.
I shall try,inthis survey,toshow why I think patent statistics are
interesting in spite of all the difficulties that arise in their useand
interpretation. To do so I shall first describe the nature of patents and the
types of data generated by their issuance, their current availability, and
some of the major problems that arise when one tries to usethemin economic
analysis. I shall next review briefly some of the earlier work on this range
of issues, focusing particularily on Jacob Schmookler's work and the questions
raised by it. This will be followedby a review of the more modern, "computer
age," work of the NEER group (Griliches, Hall, Hausman, Jaffe, Pakes,
Schankerman and others), and I shall allude also to similar work of others.
especially that of Scherer and the Yale group (Levin, Nelson, Klevorick,
Winter, Reiss, Cohen, and others), and the SPR.U group (Freeman, Pavitt, Soete
and others).I will not be able, however, to do justice to all of this work
(the work of others, of my collaborators, and even my own) but I hope to put
up enough guideposts so that the interested reader can find his own way to and
through this literature.1
Over all this work hovers the question "what can one use patent statistics
for?" Can one useitto interpret longer term trends? If so, did
inventiveness really decline in the l930s and early l940s, as indicated by such
statistics, and again in the mid l970s? Does the fact that large firms have
alower patents par R&D dollar ratio imply diminishing returnstosuch
investments? Can one use such numbers to conclude that demand forces are the
stronger determining factors in the evolution of technological progress than
supply factors, than the evolution of science, as Schaookler could be
2interpreted to say? These are the type of substantive questions thatI will
explore, though not necessarily answer, in this survey.
There is much that will not be covered in this survey.I will not discuss
the literature that deals with the social value of the patent system and with
alternative lengths of protection and licensing arrangements. Nor will I deal
with the recent and rapidly growing theoretical literature on "patent races"
and related game-theoretical topics. One has to draw the line somewhere and
the task outlined above may be already too large for one article and one person
to deal with. Nor will this be a fully "balanced" survey.I shall, per
force, concentrate more on topics that I and my research associates have found
most interesting, slighting thereby, sometimes unwittingly, some of the work
2
of others in this field.
2. Patents and Patent Statistics.
A patent is a document, issued by an authorized governmental agency,
granting the right to exclude anyone else from the production or use of a
specific new device, apparatus, or process for a stated number of years (17 in
the U.S. currently). The grant is issued to the inventor of this device or
process after an examination that focuses on both the novelty of theclaimed
item and its potential utility. The right embedded in the patent can be
assigned by the inventor to somebody else, usually to his employer, a
corporation, and/or sold to or licenced for use by somebody else. This right
can be enforced only by the potential threat of or an actual suit in the courts
for infringement damages. The stated purpose of the patent system is to
encourage invention and technical progress both by providing a temporary
3monopoly for the inventor and by forcing the early disclosure of the
information necessary for the production of this item or the operation of the
new process.
The standard of novelty and utility imposed on the granting of such a
right is not very high. (In this it probably does not differ greatly fromthe
standards imposed in most fields on the publication of scientific journal
articles.) In the U.S., for example, about 104,000 applications were filed in
1980 for ("utility") patents, of which about 65,000 were granted by the end of
1984; 1400 more were granted by the end of 1988, with another 300 or so to
follow over the next 3 to 5 years. These numbers are typical. In the U.S.
the granting success rate fluctuated around 65 percent in the 1970s. Roughly
speaking, two out of three applications are eventually granted. The granting
rate, the stringency of examination, varies greatly across countries and also
somewhat over time. It has been over 90 percent in France (until the mid-
1970s), about 80 percent in the U.K., and only 35 percent in Germany
(Schankerman and Pakes 1986, Table 1), and has varied in the U.S from a low
of 58 percent in 1965 to a high of 72 percent in 1967 (of domestic
applications between 1965 and 1980). This variablity is, as I will show
later, largely associated with differences in the procedures and resources of
the various patent offices, implying, therefore, also differences in the
average "quality" of a granted patent across countries and periods.
Of the approximately 62,000 patents granted in 1980, 24,000 or 39 percent
were granted to foreign inventors, a ratio that has been rising sharply over
the last decades, from 19 percent in the early l960s to 48 percent in 1988.
U.S. corporations have accounted for about 73 percent of the total patents
granted to U.S. inventors (in 1988), with two percent being granted to agencies
4of the U.S. government, and the rest, 25 percent, going to individual
inventors. The fraction accounted by foreign corporations of total foreign
patenting in the U.S. has risen from 64 percent in the mid 1960s to 82
percent in 1988. The general trends in such numbers are depicted in Figures 1
and 2.
Even though grants can be thought of as a moving average of past
applications, it can be seen in these figures that they tend to fluctuate as
much or more than the number of patents applied for. It is also clear that
economic conditions impinge on the rate at which patents are applied for.
Applications were lower during the Great Depression and also during the World
War II years. and their growth is retarded in the 1970s. Moreover, patents
assigned to U.S. corporations have not grown anywhere near the rate of growth
of total R&D expenditures in industry (and hence even less than the rate of
growth in company financed R&D in industry). Since I will argue below that
patents are a good index of inventive activity, a major aspect of which is
also measured by R&D expenditures, this view will need reconciling with the
aggregate facts depicted in Figure 2.
Data are also available at the firm level. In 1984 the largest patenters
were General Electric, IBM, and Hitachi with 785, 608, and 596 patents granted
respectively. Most of the major U.S. patenting firma experienced a declining
trend in patents granted during the 1970s with some recovery in the l980s,
while there has been a rapid growth in U.S. patents granted to the major
Japanese electronics and motor vehicles firms. (See Figure 5, Griliches
1989.)
What I have done in the above paragraphs is to discuss the information
implicit in patent counts, in the number of patents issued at different tii*es,
5in different countries, and to different types of inventors. This is the type
of information that economists have largely focused on, also cross-classifying
it by industry and firm, and it is the use of such numbers in economic analysis
which will be the main topic of this survey. But a patent document, which
is public after it has been granted, contains much more information than that.
Besides information on the names of inventors and their addresses and the name
of the organization to which the patent right may have been assigned, it also
lists one or more patent classes to which it has been assigned by the
examiners, cites a number of previous patents and sometimes also scientific
articles to which this particular invention may be related, and also finally,
but from the social point of view most importantly, provides a reasonably
complete description of the invention covered by this particular patent.
Thus, there is much more information derivable from the patent documents than
just simply their aggregated number in a particular year or for a particular
firm. One can study the geographic distribution of particular inventions, one
can investigate citation networks and patterns, and one can actually read the
detailed text of a series of patents in a particular field as raw material for
an economic-technological history of it. Also, in a number of foreign
countries, and in the U.S. since 1982, a non-negligable renewal fee, which
rises with the age of the patent, has to be paid. This results in a
significant abandonment of patents before their statutory expiration date and
generates, in passing, a set of potentially very interesting patent mortality
statistics.
In the U.S., aggregate patent statistics classified in a variety of ways
are released by the Office of Documentation (formerly the Office of
Technology Assessment and Forecast) at the U.S. Patent Office. Major series are
6published in the National Science Foundation's biannual Science Indicators
compendium. More detailed tabulations are available from or can be prepared by
the Patent Office and summary information on all recent patents is now also
available on CD-ROM disks. The full text of the patents can be found in a
number of depository libraries in the U.S. and can be now also accessed via
several bibliographic computerized data base services, such as Dialog and BSR.
Given the advanced search software available on these services it is possible
to conduct a variety of specific searches of such data bases, looking for
patents in a particular area or those mentioning a particular material,
instrument, or a specific earlier patent, and tabulate the results at a
reasonable cost. Patent data for other countries are being collected by the
International Patent Documentation Center in Vienna, Austria and published
annually in World Intellectual Property Annual. Country summaries are
published in OECD, Science and Technology Indicators, and by various
country statistical offices, such as Statistics, Canada. Current information
on individual foreign patents is available on line from Dialog.
There are two major problems in using patents for economic analysis:
classification and intrinsic variability. The first is primarily a technical
problem. How does one allocate patent data organized by firms or by
substantive patent classes into economically relevant industry or product
groupings? I shall discuss it shortly. The second problem is fundamentally
much harder and will be discussed at somelengthbelow. It refers to the
obvious fact that patents differ greatly in their technical and economic
significance. Many of them reflect minor improvements of little economic
value. Some of them, however, prove extremely valuable. Unfortunately, we
rarely know which are which and do not have yet a good procedure for
7"weighting" them appropriately.I shall discuss the available scraps of
evidence on this topic in Section 5 of this survey.
Patents are awarded for an invention of a chemical formula, a mechanical
device, or a process (procedure), and now even a computer program. The Patent
Office classifies patents into many (300+ in the mid l950s) classes and even
many more subclasses (over 50,000), based on its need to ease thesearch for
prior art. The resulting classification system is based primarily on
technological and functional principles and is only rarely related to
economists notions of products or well defined industries (which may be a
mirage anyway). A subclass dealing with the dispensing of liquids contains both
a patent for a water pistol and for a holy water dispenser. Another subclass
relating to the dispensing of solids contains patents on both manure spreaders
and toothpaste tubes. (Schinookler 1966, p.20) Nevertheless, with one notable
exception (Scherer 1984) and the more recent Canadian data based studies,
almost all attempts to relate patent numbers to industrial data use the
subclass system as their basic unit of assignment.
3efore any classification is attempted one has to face the inherent
ambiguity of the task. Do we want to assign the invention to the industry in
which it was made ("origin), to the industry that is likely to produce it, or
to the industry which will use the resulting product or process and whose
productivity may benefit thereby (destination or industry of "use")? Consider,
as an example, the case of a new plow invente4 in a chemical firm's research
laboratory as part of its project on new combined fertilizer and tillage
systems. It depends on what question is to be asked of the data. If we want
to study the returns to R&D expenditures we may wish to count it in the
chemical industry whence the money came to develop it. If we want to analyze
8the impact of technological change on the rate of investment, on the sale of
new equipment, we may wish to count it in the farm equipment industry. If we
are interested in its effects on measured productivity we are more likely to
count it as being relevant to agriculture. This difference in questions
reflects itself also in different classification strategies pursued by
different researchers.
Schmookler, in his main work, chose to construct data on capital goods
patents relevant to a particular industry by reviewing carefully a set of
subclasses, sampling a number of patents in them, and deciding whether most of
them were indeed likely to be used in the industry in question. He then
aggregated the total number of patents in each of the accepted subclasses into
an industry wide total. In this way he constructed time series for capital
goods inventions of relevance for the railroad industry, the paper making
industry, petroleum refining, and building construction. By focusing on
capital goods inventions only and on a few selected and better defined
industries, and by not insisting on completness or inclusivity, he made life
quite a bit easier for himself. This choice forced him, however, to forego any
serious analysis of consumer goods or manufacturing processes patenting. His
industrial classification was based on the third type: the locus of potential
use for the new or improved capital good.
In the mid 1970s the Patent Office established a research unit, the
Office of Technology Assesaent and Forecast. One of its first jobs, on a
contract from the Science Indicators Unit of the National Science Foundation,
was to try and produce patent statistics at the three and two-and-a-half SIC
digit level, corresponding roughly to the NSF's classification of applied
research and development by product field. This was done by developing a
9"concordance" between the patent class and sub-class classification and the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Where a subclass did not obviously
belong into a single SIC industry, it waS counted in all of the relevant ones,
resulting in significant double counting. The industrial allocation was based
primarily on the second notion of the relevant industrial classification:
patents were allocated to the industries which were expected to produce the
products designed by them or to use the new processes in the manufacture of
their products. The new plow patent, in the previous example, would be
assigned by the OTAF concordance to the farm equipment manufacturing industry.
The OTAF concordance was criticized early on both because of the
arbitrariness in the assigrusent of some of the subclasses and the misleading
inferences that could arise from the pervasive double counting (Scherer l982a,
Soete l983). The two most glaring examples of problems raised by such
procedures was the appearance of significant and fast growing patenting by the
Japanese in the aircraft industry, a rather surprising and mysterious
development given the rather rudimentary state of the Japanese aircraft
industry at that time. It turned out to be the result of allocating the
"engines" patents category to both motor vehicles and aircraft. Almost all of
the Japanese engine patents were automobile engine patents and since patenting
in the engine category was high relative to other kinds of aircraft patents,
it came to dominate the aircaraft patents category almost entirely. Another
example was provided by the agricultural chemicals and drug industries where
the assigned patents overlapped at the rate of 90 percent[!]. That is, only
10 percent of the patents counted in those industries were unique to them.
It isdoubtfulwhether such heavily overlapping data can be used in economic
analyses which trytolearn something about sources of technical progress by
10examining the contrasting experiences of differentindustries. The OTAF
"industry" data contained too little independentdata on the patenting
history of actual industries.
As the result of such criticisms the 1985 version of these datahas been
improved by correcting some of the more obvious errorsand by fractionalizing
the allocation of dubious subclasses, reducing thereby theiroverall importance
in the final totals. But most of the basic questionsof classification remain
still to be answered.
One way to get around some of these problems is to have the patent
examiner assign the individual patent to one or several SIC industries,based
on potential use. This is now being done inthe Canadian patent system. One
possibility, currently being pursued by Robert Evensonand his students, is to
take a sample of U.S. patents also patented in Canada and tocross-tabulate
the Canadian SIC assignments against the U.S. patent classification system,
deriving thereby an entpiricaly based and already naturallyfractionized
alternative concordance. (See Annex A of Englander, Evenson, andHanazaki,
1988, Evenson et al, 1988, and iCortum and Putnam, 1989.)
An alternative approach, first pursued by Scherer (l965aand b) and more
currently by the NBER. group (see Bound at al, 1984), startsfrom patent totals
for p*rticular firms and then groups them into industries accordingto a firm's
primary activity. This is an "origin" classification.It may be useful for
the analysis of firm level data, relating patents to the R&Dinvestments and
the subsequent fortunes of the firms where they had been originallydeveloped.
But it is much less useful for the analysis of industrial data,both because
of the conglotierateness of many of the large U.S. corporationsand because
particular patents may be having an impact far beyondthe boundaries of their
11industry of "origin."
The extensive diversification of many firms and also the variousmerger
waves create severe technical p:oblems in trying to use the patent data even at
the individual corporation level. What is noted on the patent is the name of
the organization to which it has been assigned. This organization can easily
be a subsidiary or a separate division of a larger company. Moreover, a
company may change its name and/or may merge. Since the patent office does
not employ a consistent company code in its computer record, except for the
"top patenting companies" where the list of subsidiaries is checked manually,
the company patenting numbers produced by a simple aggregation of itscomputer
records can be seriously incomplete. (See Hall et al, 1988, for additional
detail on this range of issues).
Because of such considerations and because he was interested in tracing
through the spillover effects of R&D on productivity in industries which were
most likely to benefit from them, Scherer (1982, 1984) undertook the large task
of examining over 15,000 patents awarded from June 1976 through March 1977to
the 443 largest U.S. manufacturing corporations represented in the FTC's Lines
of Business survey in 1974. There are at least two uniqueaspects to this
data construction effort: Firsts each patent was examinedindividually,
classified as to product or process invention, and assigned toup to three
potential industries of "use" or two possible general use categories. In
addition, the patent was also assigned to an industry of "origin" on the basis
of the information on the location of the inventors within the Lines of
Business structure of the particular company. That is, and this is the second
unique aspect of these data, the industry of origin was defined "below" the
company level, at the more relevant "business" or divisional level and the R&D
12expenditures of the companies were similarily subdivided and matched at this
more appropriate industrial level. One of the final products of this work was a
"technology flow" matrix, using the resulting cross-classification of patents
by industry of origin and industry of use to "flow through" the R&D
expenditures from industries in which they have been incurred to industries
whose productivity growth may reflect the fruits of such expenditures. (Such
a matrix was suggested by Schaookler 1966, p. 167.) Unfortunately, this
large, one-time data construction effort does not really have a time series
dimension to it. Moreover, the FTC has discontinued collecting data at the
Lines of Business level in 1979, making it less likely that it could be
replicated in the future.
A less ambitious but somewhat more extensive data construction effort was
pursued by the NBER group (see Bound et al, 1984, Griliches, Pakes and Hall
1987, and Hall at al, 1988) who tried to match the patent office data on
patents issued to all organizations from 1969 through 1982 with income and
balance sheet amd stock market value data for all publicly traded manufacturing
corporations, defined as of 1976, and also create a consistent historical
record for them for the period 1959-1981. The resulting data sets consisted of
a cross-section of about 2600 firms in 1976 (with over 1700 firms receiving at
least one patent between 1969 and 1979, about a 1000 firms applying for at
least one, ultimately granted, patent in 1976, and about 1500 firms reporting
R&D expenditures in 1976) and a panel of about a 1000 to 1800 firms with
detailed data between 1963 and 1981, with a subset of about 700 firms Leportirtg
consistent R&D data between 1972 and 1980. These data sets formed the basis
for a number of studies which will be discussed below.
133. Patents Indicators What?
Thereare twowaysof asking this question: What aspects of economic
activity do patent statistics actually capture? And, what would we like them
to measure? Ultimately, only the first question is of relevance but it is
useful to spend some time on the second, since it provides someunderstanding
of the research in this field.
Roughly speaking, we would like to measure and understand better the
economic processes which lead to the reduction in the cost of producing
existing products and the development of new products and services. We would
like to measure both the inputs and the outputs of suchprocesses, to
understand what determines the allocation of resources to such"technology
changing" activities, and also what is happening and why to the efficiency
with which they are pursued in different times and in different places.
Assuming that different new products can be brought to a common denominator
through the use of some meta-hedonic function, one can think of invention as
shifting outward the production possibilities frontier for some generalized
aggregate of potential human wants. Ideally, we might hope that patent
statistics would provide a measure of the output of such anactivity, a direct
reading on the rate at which the potential production possibilities frontier
is shifting outward. The reality, however, isvery far from it.
The dream of getting hold of an output indicator of inventiveactivity
is one of the strong motivating forces for economic research in thisarea.
After all,apatent does represent a minimal quantumofinvention which has
passedboththe scrutiny of the patent office as to its novelty and the test
of the investment of effort and resourcesby the inventor and his organization
14into the development of this product or idea, indicating thereby thepresence
of a non-negligible expectation as to its ultimate utility and marketability.
One recognizes, of course, the presence of a whole host of problems: Not all
inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patented, and the inventions
that are patented differ greatly in "quality," in the magnitude of inventive
output associated with them. The first two problems, one thinks, can be taken
care of by industry dummy variables, or by limiting the analysis to a
particular sector or industry. For the third, one tries to invoke the help of
the "Law of Large Numbers": "the economic ...significanceof any sampled
patent can also be interpreted as a random variable with some probability
distribution." (Scherer 1965, p. 1098.) The question whether our samples are
large enough, given the underlying heterogeneity in what is measured by a
patent, is a topic to which I shall return below.
It is interesting to note that Schmookler started out thinking that he
could use patent statistics as an index of inventive output and as an
explanation of the growth in the aggregate efficiency of the U.S. economy.
Schmookler was the first, as far as I can tell, to publish numbers on
aggregate "total factor productivity growth" (Schmookler 1952) (though he
never seemed to have claimed much originality for it), and to relate them to
patent statistics (Schmookler 1951). Unfortunately, the relationship did not
work. There seemed to be little correlation between aggregate total factor
productivity and total patenting numbers. Schmookler did not give up on
patent statistics but ultimately redefined what he thought they could do.
In his hands patents became an index of inventive "activity," primarily an
input rather that an output index.
He moved, essentially, in the direction of what patents can measure
rather than what we would want theii to measure. His interpretation of
15inventive activity became quite narrow. It excluded research, which he
interpreted as a search for new knowledge, an attempt to discover new
properties of classes of objects or processes, and it excluded also
development, which is largely the development and refinement of already made
inventions (even though quite a few patents are likely to be generated also
during this phase).. Inventive activity per se is "work specifically directed
towards the formulation of the essential properties of a novel product or
process" (Schmookler 1966, p.8.) This is an "input" definition, to be thought
of as computable in manhour equivalents and corresponds to only a very thin
slice, both quantitatively and in the time dimension, of what is usually
covered by the notion of R&D and the associated R&D statistics.
One should keep in mind, however, the historical context of most of the
earlier work on patents. There were no R&D expenditure statistics ofany
generality before the late 1950s and only scattered numbers on scientists
employed in different industrial laboratories or on the distribution of the
technically trained labor force (see Mowery, 1983). Thus, an indicator of
input was also valuable. There was almost no substitute for it. Even today,
with data much more plentiful, the available detail in the published R&D
statistics is still quite limited. Thus, as I shallargue below, showing that
patent statistics are a good indicator of inputs into inventive activity is a
useful accomplishment on its own merit. tt allows us an insight into what is
going on in more areas and also in much more detail than is possible to
glimpse from the available R&D statistics.
How doesonecome to know whether patent statistics measure anything
interesting? Input or output? One way of doing it is by looking for
correlatjop.g between patent counts and other variables whichare thought to
16matter: input measures such as R&D expenditures, and output measures such as
productivity growth, profitability, or the stock market value of the firm. It
is useful, therefore, to introduce here a figure (Fig. 3) from Fakes and
Griliches (1984) which essentially restates the previous sentence in graphic
terms and allows a more detailed discussion of its underlying assumptions.
In the center of Figure 3 is an unobservable variable, K, the net
accretion of economically valuable knowledge. This is the variable that we
would like to measure. It is the measure of "inventive output" which one
would hope that patents would be a good indicator of. The diagram indicates
that and adds an error v to the determinants of patenting, making them an
imperfect, fallible measure of K. The causal part of this diagram starts in
the lover right hand corner with some observable measure of resources
invested in inventive activity (R), usually R&D expenditures, or the number
of research scientists, which are directed at the production of K. Because
knowledge production is stochastic, the u term is added to reflect its
changing efficiency and the impact of other informal and unmeasured sources of
K. The variables that we are ultimately interested in explaining are
represented by the Vs. These could be various measures of growth, in the
productivity, profitability, or the stock market value of the firm. They are
all affectedby the unobservable K, by other measurable variables X, and by
additional random components, the a's.
A number of extreme simplifications were made in drawing this figure and
in defining the various terms. For example, the relationship between K and
K should be defined explicitly to allow for the possibility of decay in the
private value of knowledge. Also, R is taken as exogeneous. If, as is
likely, the u's are correlated over time, then one might expect them to feed
17back into R in subsequent periods. Nor do patents play an explicit economic
role here. They are just an indicator of K. The assumption being made is
that some random fraction of K gets patented. It is a statistical
descriptive model rather than a theoryN of patenting. A Ntheoryu would have
to be more explicit about the conditions (economic, technological, and legal)
for the benefits from applying for a patent outweighing the potential monetary
costs and technology disclosure consequences and would add more structure to
the relationship between P and K.
Such a theory would start with the underlying notion of a research
project whose success depends stochastically on both the amount of resources
devoted to it and the amount of time that such resources have been deployed.
Each technical success is associated with an expectation of the ultimate
economic value of a patent to the inventor or the employer. If this
expectation exceeds a certain minimum, the cost of patenting, a patent will be
applied for. That is, the number of patents applied for is a count of the
number of successful projects (inventions) with the economic value of the
patent right exceeding a minimal threshold level. If the distribution of the
expected value of patenting successful projects remains stable, and if the
level of current and past R&D expenditures shifts the probability that
projects will be technically successful, an increase in the number of patents
can be taken as an indicator of an upward shift in the distribution of K.
Whether the relationship is proportional will depend on the shape of the
assumed distributions and the nature of the underlying shifts in them. What
is depicted in Fig. 3is at best a very crude reduced-form-typerelation whose
theoretical underpinningshave still to be worked out. But one has to start
someplace
18There are also ambiguities in the definition of K and K. Are we
talking about private or social returns to knowledge? That depends on the
Z's available to us and the question we are particularily interested in
answering. For an analysis of productivity movements at the level of
industries, it is the social value that we care about. For an analysis of
the stock market value of different firms, only the private value version
makes any sense. One may also wish to distinguish between the value of patent
rithts and the economic value of a particular patent. It is the latter notion
that we might be interested in, though it is the former that is likely to show
up in survey responses of patentors or be implicit in the decision whether to
pay a fee and renew a particular patent. Nevertheless, Figure 3 does provide
a schema for discussing much of the research in this area and in particular
the question of the "quality" of patent counts as indicators of economically
valuable knowledge.
There are several different ways of rephrasing this question: 1. How good
isPas an indicator of K?2. If P is an "output" measure and R is an
"input" measure, are we better off in having one or the other if we had to, or
could, make such a choice? 3. What is the value added of P, above and beyond
1(, to the explanation of the Z's? Since IC is intrinsically unobservable,
the first question cannot really be answered without embedding it in some
model such as is sketched out in this figure. It may be helpful, at this





where the first equation is the "Knowledge production function" with the
19unobservable K being measured in units of R; the second equation is the
indicator function relating P to K; and third equation represents the
influence of K on subsequent variables of interest. The important
assumption that will be made here is that the various random components u, v,
and e are independent of each other.I need not repeat the caveats about the
simplicity of this model. It is adequate, however, for making the following
points: 1. The "quality" of P as indicator of K depends on the size of v,
the error in the indicator relationship. If we take its variance as a measure
of its error and we substitute R for K in this relationship, as in the
right-hand part of the second equation above, we see that under the
assumptions of the model the "quality" of the relationship between P and R
provides a lower bound on the "quality" of P as an indicator of K. That is
var(au+v) > var(v). This argument suggests looking at the correlation between
P and R and claiming that if K is the output of the R process and P is
an indicator of its success then the correlation between P and K would
have been even higher, if it could have been measured. This is the sense in
which the correlation coefficient between P and R provides a downward
biased measure of the quality of P as a indicator.5 2. The comparative
qualities of P and R as proxies for K depend on the relative size of the
variance of v and u. If the error of measurement in P is large relative
to the stochastic fluctuation in K, then R may be the better variable even
if it does not reflect u.3. If the stochastic component of K is
important and if P actually captures any of it, there should be some value
addd in P above and beyond R. But if th. error of measurement in P is
large and the samples are small, we may not really see it in the regressions
results when P isincludedas an additional variable.
204. Patents and R&D.
In the attempt to "validate" patents as an economic indicator their
relationship to R&D activity has been investigated repeatedly. Schmookler
(1966, Chapter 2) and Scherer (1965) are leading examples of earlier
investigations. More recent results can be found in Bound et al (1984), Hall
et al (1986), Pakes and Griliches (1984), Scherer (1983) and Acs and Audretch
(1989). Several conclusions as well as a number of unresolved questions
emerge from this work.
A major conclusion, emphasized by Pakes and Griliches, is that there is
quite a strong relationship between R&D and the number of patents received at
the cross-sectional level, across firms and industries. The median R-square is
on the order of 0.9, indicating that patents may indeed be a good indicator of
unobserved inventive output, at least in this dimension. That this
relationship is not just due to size differences can be seen in Figure 4
(taken from Bound et al), which plots both patents and R&D per unit of a
firm's assets.
The same relationship, thougi still statistically significant, is much
weaker in the within-firms time series dimension. The median R-square here is
on the order of 0.3 (in contrast to the 0.9 in the cross-sectional dimension).
Nevertheless, the evidence is quite strong that when a firm changes its R&D
expenditures, parallel changes occur also in its patent numbers. The
relationship is close to contemporaneous with some lag effects which are small
and not well estimated (Hall et al). This is consistent with the observation
that patents tend to be taken out relatively early in the life of a research
project. Since the bulk of R&D expenditures are spend on development, most of
21the time series variance in this variable must come from the differential
success in the further development of existing projects rather than from the
initiation of new ones.6 The relatively low correlations in the time
dimension should, therefore, not be all that surprising, but they imply that
patent numbers are a much poorer indicator of short-term changes in the output
of inventive activity or the "fecundity" of R&D.
The question of "Are there diminishing returns to R&D?" hovers over much
of this work. In the cross-sectional dimension it is related to the
"Schumpeterian" question whether large firms and large R&D labs are more or
less efficient as "engines of innovation." (See Baldwin and Scott, Chap. 3,
and Cohen and Levin for more general reviews of this topic.) In the time
series dimension one is faced with the declining ratio of patents received per
R&D dollar spent and the worry that technological and inventive opportunities
are being exhausted. There is also the question how does one reconcile the
significantly larger estimates of the elasticity of patenting with respect to
R&D in the cross-sectional versus the tlme-series dimensions.
At the cross-sectional level the story is relatively simple. Small firms
appear to be more "efficient," receiving a larger number of patents per R&D
dollar. This can be seen most easily in Figure 5 (from Bound at a].), which
plots the patents per R&D ratio as a function of the size of the R&D program.
It shows both the much higher ratio for small firms and the fact that this
relationship becomes effectively flat, beyond some minimum size. At the
larger firm level, where anti-trust policy might be relevant, there is no
strong evidence of diminishing returns to the size of the R&D effort. (This is
also the conclusion reached by Scherer, 1983, on the basis of a different and
better set of data.) Given the non-linearity and the noisiness in this
22relation, the finding of "diminishing returns" is quite sensitive to
functional form, weighting schemes, and the particular point at which the
elasticity is evaluated.
All of this can be seen in Figure 6, also taken from Bound et al, which
plots the original data and the results of fitting various different models to
the same data. Two of the estimation techniques, Poisson and Non-linear Least
Squares, indicate diminishing returns, while the other two techniques, OLS and
Negative Binomial, imply increasing returns. A glance at the figure will make
it clear how a differential emphasis on parts of the data (large versus small
firms and the treatment of zeroes -notvisible in the figure) could result in
such conflicting estimates. Basically there is a sharp contrast between
smaller and larger firms. For larger firms the relationship is close to linear
while there is a reasonably large number of smaller firms that exhibit
significant patenting while reporting very little R&D. When divided into two
samples, small (N—1015) and large(N—483), with $2 million in R&D expenditures
as the dividing line, the estimated average elasticities are 0.44 and 1.04
respectively. The latter number falls to 0.8 (0.1) if one allows separately for
the zero patents observations. Though this estimate of the elasticity of
patenting with respect to R&D for the larger firms is still "significantly"
less than unity at conventional test levels, allowing for the possibility that
the R&D numbers are themselves subject to error, one cannot really reject the
hypothesis of constant returns in this size range, since the "reciprocal"
regression of R&D on patents implies increasing returns or decreasing costs of
getting a patent. (The estimated elasticity of R&D with respect to patents is
0.76).
..The appearance of diminishing returns at the cross-sectional level is due.
23I think, primarily to twoeffects:selectivity and the differential role of
formal R&D and patents for small and large firms. Most of the data sets
available to us are not based on a random or carefully stratified sample from
the relevent underlying population. Rather, they are "opportunity" samples,
based on other criteria. For example, the 1976 cross-section of Bound et al,
is based on all manufacturing firms listed on the New York and American Stock
exchanges and also on the Over-the-counter market. But while almost all
relevant large firms are so listed, only a relatively small number of the
smaller firms trade in these markets. To be included in (listed on) the
market, a small firm has to be in some sense more "succsessful" than those
that are not, more "interesting" to the traders. Thus, it is not surprising
that it may also hold more patents than might be expected, given its size and
R&D program. How atypical these small firms might be is suggested by the
rarity of their selection. Table 1 shows the number of firms by size
(employment) in this cross-section and the corresponding numbers in the
relevant population. While about two-thirds of the large manufacturing firms
are included, the smaller one represent less than one percent of all small
firms and are obviously a heavily selected lot. Unfortunately, we have no
information on the firms not in the sample and hence cannot mak. an
appropriate sample selectivity adjustment.
Another source of the difference between small and large firms is in the
role of formal R&D in them and the differential importance of patents to them.
A significant amountofpatenting is not the result of formal R&D activities
though the relative importance of organized R&D rises with the size of the
company. Small firms are likely to be doing relatively more informal R&D,
reporting less of it, and hence providing the appearance of more patents per
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reported R&D dollar. Also, for such firms patents may represent their
major hope for ultimate success and hence would lead them to pursue them with
more vigor. A well established major firmdoesnot depend as much on current
patenting for its viability or the survival of its market position. Thus, even
at equal underlying true inventiveness rates, the propensity to patent may be
lower for large firms, at least relative to the successful new entrants in
their field. But in the major range of the data, from middle size to giant
firms, there is little evidence for diminishing returns, at least in terms of
patents per R&D dollar.8 That is not surprising, after all. If there were
such diminishing returns, firms could split themselves into divisions or
separate enterprises and escape them.
The time series dimension has been examined most extensively by Hall et
al (1986) (see also Fakes and Griliches 1984 and Hausman et al 1984). The
estimated total elasticity of patents with respect to R&D expenditures is
between 0.3 and 0.6, even after allowing for several lagged effects. This
finding, in contrast to the cros-sectional results, is robust with respect to
differential weighting and alternative estimation methods. It is tempting then
to accept the diminishing returns result in the within-time-series dimension
and interpret it as reflecting real diminishing returns, in terms of patents
received, to the expansion of existing research programs. But this conclusion
is unnecessary. The relationship between annual changes in R&D and in
patenting is very weak, although ustatisticallyhs significant, at the firm
level. If one allows for the possibility that much of the annualfluctuations
in R&D has little to do with that part of inventive activity which generates
patents, being largely the result of fluctuations in and vaguaries of the
development portion of the various research projects, then the relevantM R&D
25is measured with error and the estimated coefficients are downward biased.
This is not a pure "measurement error" case, since reported R&D may be
correctly reported as far as its own definition goes, but not exactly what we
want (R&D directed at patentable inventions). This is parallel to the
transitory-permanent distinction in consumption theory and is isomorphic to
the "errors-in-variables" model. Invoking the latter, we may be able to
"bracket" the true returns to scale coefficient by running the regression the
other way, R&D on patents, and computing the reciprocal of the resulting
coefficient. The low correlation between the two rates of change results also
in a very low coefficient in this second dimension, on the order of 0.1-0.2,
and an implication of increasing returns. The latter should not be taken
seriously either, since it is the result of the great randomness in the patent
series themselves. The point of this digression is, however, to remind one
that the appearance of diminishing returns in such data could be an artifact
of the incompleteness of the underlying data rather then a reflection of the
characteristics of the invention process itself. As of the moment, the
evidence is suggestive but not conclusive.
Besides differing by size of firm, the R&D to patents relationship
differs also across industries. In absolute terms, the industries with the
largest numbers of patents are drugs, plastics, other rubber products, and
computers (in Scherer's LB based data) and instruments, comeunication
equipment, and industrial chemical. (in the OTAP concordance based data). In
t.rms of the "propensity to patent" (patent. per R&D dollar), the differences
are lessapparent andmore difficult to interpret. One can look at the tables
(5-9) in Griliches (1989) or the Appendix to Cockburn and Criliches (1988)and
observe that "low" propensity to patent industries include obvious cases of
26large R&D industries with significant governmental research support, such as
motor vehicles and aircraft, who patent very much less than would be predicted
from their R&D numbers alone. Amongst the "high" propensity to patent
industries, besides the expected presence of communication equipment, there
are a number of industries (such as Screws, Nuts, and Bolts) whose appearance
is due to their doing very little R&D but still taking out some occasional
patents. An attempt to explain the dispersion in such numbers across
industries using data from the Yale Survey (Levin et al, 1987) on the
perceived differential effectiveness of patents as a method of appropriating
the benefits from innovation was largely unsuccessful. The patent to R&D
ratios appear to be dominated by what may be largely irrelevant fluctuations
in the R&D numbers and the Yale Survey responses themselves appear to have
little relevant cross industry variability in them (see Griliches, 1987,
Cockburn and Gri].iches 1988 and Cockburn 1989). For example, while the drug
industry has the highest rating on the patents provide protection scale, its
patents per R&D ratio is much lower than that for firms in the paper industry,
where the effectiveness of patents is rated to be somewhat below average (see
Cockburn and Griliches, appendix C). Since the effectiveness of patents as an
appropriability mechanism will affect also the incentive to do R&D, the
resulting impact on the ratio of the two is far from obvious. In drugs it
clearly encourages research with the result that even with extensive patenting
the observed ratio is not much above average. Thus, it is probably misleading
to interpret such numbers as being direct indicators of either the
effectiveness of patenting or the efficiency of the R&D processes.
275. Patents Rights and Patent Values
Because the economic significance of individual patents is so variable,
there has been continued interest in trying to estimate the average value of
patent rights, the average value of the invention represented by a particular
patent, and the dispersion in both of these concepts. Looking at patents as
indicators of success of the underlying inventive activity or R&D program, we
are mainly interested in the second concept. The available data, however,
are mostly informative only about the first: the value associated with the
differential legal situation created by the possession of the patent.
There are basically three sources of data on this topic: 1. Results of
direct surveys of patent owners or assignees about past returns and the
potential market value of their rights. 2. The valuation implicit in the
decision whether to pay a fee to renew the patent, a decision that had to be
made by European patent holders in the past and is now also facing U.S.
patent holders.And 3, econometric analyses of the relationship of some
other value denominated variable, such as profits or stock market value, to the
number of patents. An example is the use of patent numbers as a proxy for
"intangible" capital in stock-market-value of the firmregressions.
The most detailed and extensive survey of patent holders was conducted
over 30 years ago by Bark.v Sanders and associates at the Patent and
Trademarks Foundation (see Rossnan and Sanders 1957, Sanders et al 1958, and
Sanders 1962 and 1964, and the discussion of it in Schmookler's book, pp. 47-
55). They conducted a mail survey in 1957 of theownersatd assignees of a
twopercentrandom sample of all patents issued in 1938, 1948, and 1952. There
were twomajorfindings in this survey: 1. A surprisingly large fraction of
all sampled patents wasreportedto have been "used" co.rcia11y, either
28currently or in the past. The actual fraction "used" is sensitive to the
treatment of non-response. it is over 55 percent for those responding and
about 41 percent if one assumes that non-response is equivalent to non-use.
The "use" percentage is higher for "small" companies, but so is also the non.
response rate (71 percent used among respondents, 40 percent if adjusted for
non-response). Thus,itis not true that most patents are never used and are
hence not associated with a significant economic event. This finding is also
consistent with the renewal information to be discussed below. In Europe,
about 50 percent of all patents granted are still being renewed and a renewal
fee is being paid 10 years after they had been applied for. 2. The reported
economic gain from the innovations associated with these patents was very
dispersed. Among the patents reported to be in current use and with relevant
numerical responses and a positive gain (accounting for about 20 percent of
all the relevant responses), the mean value was $577,000 per patent, but the
median value was only about $25,000 (implying, under the assumption of log-
normality, 2.5 as the coefficient of variation and a standard deviation of
about $1.5 million). If one includes all the no gain, loss, and not yet used
patents, the mean gain falls to about $112,000, and the median is close to
zero or below, (computed from the tables in Sanders et ci, 1958, p. 355 and
357). Even this lover mean number is quite impressive, roughly equivalent to
$473,000 per average patent in 1988 prices (using the GNP deflator to convert
it from 1957 prices), but so isalsothe associated dispersion. Scherer
(1965) reports that fitting a Pareto-Levy distribution to these data
graphically yielded an estimate of the exponent (alpha) of about 0.5, implying
a distribution with no finite mean or variance. If this were truly the case,
then even in large samples the mean value of patents would not converge
29rapidly, if at all, to its underlying population average.
Therehave been only very few other attempts atsucha survey and they
all reachrather similar conclusions. Schmookler (1966, P. 54-5) reports on a
small mail sample with a mean value of $80,000 and a median of about zero. In
1982 the Chemistry Program of NSF decided to evaluate the economic value of
patents attributable to its grants (Cutler 1984). Of the 96 patents surveyed,
52 had been licensed or were deemed licensable with an average "economic
value" of about $500,000 per patent. (The concept of "economic value" is
unclear in this study. It appears to refer to total potential sales of the
product rather than net returns to the owners of the patent.) A related
study, done for the NSF by SRI International (1985), examined a sample of patents
received by the grantees of the Engineering Program and estimated the royalty
potential of each patent, which turned out to be about $73,000 on average,
again with a very large dispersion. A more representative and large scale
survey of patent holders is both feasible and desirable but nothing has been
don. in this regard since 1957 and there does not seem to be anything like it
in th. works either in the U.S. or abroad.
In many countries and recently also in the U.S., holders of patents must
payan annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force. If the
renewal fee is not paid in any single year th.patent is permanently
cancelled.Assuming that renewaldecisions arebased on economic criteria,
ag.ntswill only renew their patentsif the value of holding them over an
additional yearexceeds th.cost of such renewal. Observations on the
proportionofpatents that are renewed at alternative ages, together with
the r.levant renewal fee schedules, will then contain information on the
distribution of the value of holding patents, and on the evolution of this
30distribution function over the lifespan of the patents. Since patent rights
are seldom marketed, this is one of the few sources of information on their
value. In a series of papers Fakes and Schankerman (1984), Fakes (1986), and
Schanicerman and Pakes (1986) present and estimate models which allow them to
recover the distribution of returns from holding patents at each age over
their lifespan. Since the renewal decision is based on the value of patent
protection to the patentee, the procedure used in these articles directly
estimates the private value of the benefits derived from the patent laws.
In Figure 8 typical European data on renewal fees and patent survival
proportions are reproduced from Schankerman and Fakes (1986). They indicate
several interesting facts that should be kept in mind. About half of all
patents are renewed through age 10, indicating a significant expectation of
some "usefulness" for the majority of patents for some non-negligible time
period. On the other hand, the same data indicate that about half of all
patents are not renewed within ten years, indicating that the expected value
of the future income stream from these rights has fallen below the rather low
renewal cost. This implies that the majority of patents are either of low
value, or that their value depreciates (obsoletes) rapidly, or both. About 10
percent of all patents survive and pay the fees for the whole statutory period
and obviously contain a smaller number of very valuable patents. Fakes and
Schankerman use these facts in their various papers to construct models of the
renewal process and estimate both a distribution of the underlying patent
right values and also their rate of depreciation. Given the existence of an
open-ended class of patents in these data (those paying the renewal fees
throughout the whole period) and the rather low and relatively stable renewal
fee schedules, serious identification problems arise in such models. The
31estimates of the mean value of patent rights rest, therefore, on specific
assumptions about the functional form of their distribution (how it looks in
the unseen tail) and on assumptions about the form of the depreciation
process. Some of these assumptions may be testable and some of the more
interesting conclusions of their work do not depend on them, but ultimately we
have to put some prior notions into such data to have them yield specific
numerical answers. The issues of identification and estimation are discussed
in much detail in the recent papers by Pakes and Simpson (1989) and
Schankerman (1989), together with the presentation of interesting new results
on additional countries and on industrial detail, and hence will not be
pursued further here. (See also Lanjouw, 1989, Schankerman 1990, and Lanjouw
and Schankerman 1989.)
In the United States, patents which were applied for after 1980 have to
pay renewal fees 3 1/2, 7 1/2, and 11 1/2 years after the granting date.
Thes. fees are currently $450, $890, and $1340 respectively for corporations
and somewhat less than that for individuals and "small entities." As of the
end of 1988, 16 percent of the 1981-84 patents coming up to the payment of the
first maintenace fee "expired," with a slightly higher expiration rate for
U.s.(17percent) than for patents owned by foreign residents (15 percent)
implying, possibly, a higher average value or "quality"forthe latter. An
earlier study of a smaller sample of such data found that individually owned
patents were expiring at a much higher rate than assigned patents (39 vs 13
percent for U.S. origin patents) and that "mechanical" patents had the highest
and "chemical" patents the lowest rates of expiration (Manchuso et al, 1987).
The growing availability of such renewal data in the future will provide us
with another very interesting window on the inventive process and its rewards
32in the U.S.
Returning to the specific results from the work on European patent
renewals, using a learning model for the early years of a patent's life, Pakes
(1986) finds that patents are applied for at an early stage in the inventive
process, a stage in which there is still substantial uncertainty concerning
both the returns that will be earned from holding the patents, and the returns
that will accrue to the patented ideas. Gradually the patentors uncover more
information about the actual value of their patents.t'lost turn out to be of
little value, but the rare "winner" justifies the investments that were made
in developing them. His estimates imply also that most of the uncertainty
with respect to the value of a patent is resolved during the first three or
four years of its life. Using this result, Schankerman and Pakes (1986)
examine changes in the distribution of patent values over time and the
correlates of these changes. The substantive results from these papers imply
that the average value of a patent right is quite small, about $7,000 in the
population of patent applications in France and the UK. In Germany, where
only about 35 percent of all patent applications are granted (about 93 percent
and 83 percent were granted in France and the UK respectively), the average
value of a patent right among grants was about $17,000. The distribution of
these values, however, is very dispersed and skewed. One percent of patent
applications in France and the UK had values in excess of $70,000 while in
Germany one percent of patents granted had values in excess of $120,000.
Moreover, half of all the estimated value of patent rights accrues to between
five and ten percent of all the patents. The annual returns to patent
protection decay rather quickly over time, with rates of obsolescence on the
order of 10 to 20 percent per year. Since about 35,000 patents were applied
33for per year in France and the UK and about 60,000 in Germany, these figures
imply that though the aggregate value of patent rights is quite large, it is
only on the order of 10 to 15 Dercent of the total national expenditures on
R&D. Other means of appropriating the benefits of R&D must be, therefore,
quite important.
Schankerman and Pakes used their results to adjust the aggregate patent
time series for changes in their average "quality" (value). In their 1986
paper they find that even though the number of patents per scientist fell rather
sharply between 1965 and 1975 in the three countries examined by them, the
estimated "quality-adjusted" total value of patent rights per scientist and
engineer was effectively stable in both Germany and the UK, and dropped
only slightly in France (Schankerman and Pakes, 1986, Table 6).10
346. Patents Stock Market Value
Another line of work has used data on the stock market valuation of finns
to investigate both the "value" of patents and the information content of the
variability in their numbers. The use of stock market values as an "output"
indicator of the research process has one major advantage. All other
indicators of success, such as profits or productivity are likely to reflect
it only slowly and erratically. On the other hand, when an event occurs that
causes the market to reevaluate the accumulated output of a firm's research
endeavours, its full effect on the expected present value of a firm's future
net cash flows should be recorded immediately. This, of course, need not
equal what will eventually materialize. The downside of this type of
measurement is the large volatility in stock market measures. The needle
might be there but the haystack can be very large.
The simplest market value model starts from the market valuation
identity, with the market value of the firm proportional to its physical
("tangible") and intangible capital, the latter being in part the product of
its past R&D investments and possibly 'also reflected in its accumulated patent
position (Griliches 1981, Ben-Zion 1984, Hirschey 1982, and Cockburn and
Griliches 1988, among others). It can be written as follows:
V —q(A+gK)—qA(l+gK/A)
where V is the market value of the firm, A is the current replacement cost of
its tangible assets, K is its level of intangible ("knowledge") capital and g
is its relative shadow price, and q is the current premium or discount of
market value over the replacement cost of tangibleassets.11 Writing q as
35exp(a+u), where a represents individual firmdifferencesin average valuation
due to the exclusion of other unmeasured capital components or market position
variables, taking logarithms, and approximating log(l+x) —x,we can rewrite
the estimating equation as:
lnQ—ln(V/A) —a+g}(/A+u
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of what has come to be called
"Tobin's Q." Using different measures of current and past patents and current
and past R&D expenditures as proxies for K, this kind of equation has been
estimated by various researchers. Table 3 reproduces a number of results from
the Cockburn and Criliches study. It shows that if we look at patents alone
the estimated value of a recent patent is about $500,000. This estimate is
halved when we put in both past and current R&D expenditures in the equation.
By and large. R&D is the "stronger" variable. The evidence for additional
information in the patent variables varies from sample to sample (patents were
stronger in the Criliches 1981 study which was based on a much smaller sample
of firms but also used the panel aspects of the data) and depends on which
other variables are included in the equation (see the move of the results from
columns 2 to 3 in this table).12
A more dynamic point of view is taken by Pakes (1985) in his analysis of
the relationship between patents, R&D, and the stock market rate of return.
Events occur which affect the market value of a firm's R&D program and what
one estimates ar. the reduced form relationships between the percentage
increase in this valu, and current and subsequent changes in the firm's R&D
expenditures, its patent applications, and the market rate of return on its
stock. His empirical results indicate that about five percent of the variance
in the stock market rate of return is caused by the events which change both
R&D and patent applications. This leads to a significant correlation between
36movements in the stock market rate of return and unpredictablechanges in both
patents and R&D expenditures. changeswhich could not be predicted from past
values of patents and R&D. On average, an "unexpected" increasein one patent
is associated with an increase in the firm'smarket value of $810,000, while
an unexpected increase of $100 of R&D expendituresis, on average, associated
with a $1,870 increase in the value of the firm. Patents areestimated to
contain a significant noise component (a componentwhose variance is not
related to either the R&D or the stock market rateof return series). This
noise component accounts for only a small fractionof the large differences
in the number of patent applications of differentfirms (about 25%), but plays
a much larger role among the smallerfluctuations that occur in the patent
applications of a given firm over time (about 95%).Similarly, the effect of
unexpected increases in patents on marketvalue is highly variable.
Nevertheless, there is still some information in thetime-series dimension.
If we were to observe, for example, a sudden largeburst in the patent
applications of a given firm, we could be quite surethat events have occurred
to cause a large change in the marketvalue of its R&D program; but smaller
changes
ii the patent applications of a given firm are not likely to be very
informative.
The timing of the response of patents and R&D to eventswhich change the
value of a firm's R&D effort is quite similar.One gets the impression from
the estimates that such events cause a chainreaction, inducing an increase in
R&D expenditures far into the future, and thatfirms patent around the links
of this chain almost as quickly as they are completed,resulting in a rather
close relationship between R&D expenditures andthe number of patents applied
for. Perhaps surprisingly, Pakes finds noevidence that independent changes
in the number of patents applied for (independent
of current and earlier R&D
37expenditures) produce significant effects on the market's valuation of the
firm.Henceit is not possible to distinguish between demand shocks, where
demand shocks are loosely defined as events which cause increases in patenting
only through the R&D expenditures they induce, and technological or supply
shocks which may have a direct effect on patents as well as an indirect effect
via induced R&D demand.
It is not obvious whether one can separate "demand" from "supply" factors
in this area, even conceptually. One way of defining "demand" factors is to
identify them with macro shifts in aggregate demand, population, exchange
rates, and relative factor prices that make inventive activity more (or less)
profitable at a given level of scientific information, a fixed "innovation
possibilities frontier." Changes in technological "opportunity," on the other
hand, are those scientific and technological breakthroughs which made
additional innovation more profitable or less costly at a fixed aggregate or
industry level demand. These distinctions are far from sharp, especially
given our inability to measure the contributions of science and technology
directly. Moreover, what is a technological opportunity in one industry
mayspilloveras a derived demand effect to another. Nevertheless, there is
something distinct in these factors, in their sources of change and
dynamics.13
Patentdata could help here if one were willing to assume that
independent, "unanticipated" shifts in the level of patenting by firms,
represent shifts in technological opportunities and not responses to
changes in economic conditions (demand forces). That is, the identiying
assumption is that demand impinges on the level of patenting only through
the level of R&D expenditures (and slowly changing trends) and that the "news"
component in the patent statistics reflects technological "news," the
information that a particular line of research has turned out to be more (or
38less) fruitful or easier (harder) than expected when the decision to invest in
it was made originally. Changes in technological opportunity are thus
identified with "abnormal," "unexpected," bursts (or declines) in the number
of patents applied for.
Several implications of this formulation are immediate. If patent
statistics contain additional information about shifts in technological
opportunities, then they should be correlated with current changes in market
value above and beyond their current relationship with R&D and they
should affect R&D levels in the future, even in the presence of the change in
market value variable since the latter variable is measured with much error.
Patents should "cause" R&D in the sense of Granger (1969).
The available evidence on this point is not too encouraging: As noted
above, Griliches (1981) found a significant independent affect of patents on
the market values of firms, above and beyond their R&D expenditures, but Pakes
did not detect a significant influence of lagged patents on R&D in the
presence of lagged R&D and the stock market rate of returnvariables. Nor did
Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1986) find future R&D affecting current patenting
as the "causality" argument might have implied. Griliches, Hall and Pakes
(1990) replicate some of Fakes' computations on a larger sample (340 firms)
and expand his equation system to add equations for sales, employment, and
investment. Their results indicate that the addition of the latter variables
is helpful, in the sense that fluctuations in their growth rates are related
to fluctuations in both the growth rate of R&D and the stock market rateof
return and hence should help in identifying the relationships we are
interested in. But the expansion of the sample to include many small firms
with low levels of patenting, deteriorates significantly the informational
content of this variable, raising its noise to signal ratio, and making it
hard to discern a feedback from the independent variablity in patenting to any
39of the other variables. Thus, at the moment, it does not look as if the data
can sustain a model with. two separate factors ("market"and "technological"
innovations), even though in principle such a model is identifiable.
The difficulties in implementing such models arise to a large extent
from the large "noise" component in patents as indicators of R&D output inthe
short-run within-firm dimension. While the problem mayhavebeen obvious from
the beginning, it was the work of Pakes and Schankerman (1984) and their
estimates of the dispersion and the skewness in patent value which alerted
us to its actual magnitude.
To derive quantitative implications of such a skewed distribution of
values for the quality of this indicator we can combine what we know about
patent counts in both the time series and cross section dimensionwith
estimates of the distribution of their values.
One can write the innovation in the value of the firm(netof its
expected dividend and investment policy) asthesum of three components:
qV —w++ Ut
wher. is the rate of return on stock holding, Vt is the total
market-value of the firm's assets, and thethreecomponents u and u
are defined to be orthogonal to each other; w corresponds to the change in
the value of a firm's R&D "position" (program) arising from the "news"
associated with current patent applications; reflects revaluations of
previous achievements associated with past patents (above and beyond their
correlation with current patents); while u reflects all other sources of
fluctuation in the value of the firm, including also possibly the contribution
of not patented R&D. Looking first at w and the role of patent numbers as
40an indicator of it we can ask about the possible magnitudeof the variance of
w (relative tothe variance of qV). That is, how large could the
contribution of current patents be to the explanation of fluctuationsin
market value, even if we had a perfect measures of these values?




and assume that (1) p, the number of patents appliedfor each year is
distributed as a Poisson random variable with a mean, A,which is a
distributed lag of past R&D expenditures (see Hausman, Hall,and Criliches
1985); and (2) y. is the underlying value ofeach patent and is distributed
as a log-normal random variable with a meanand variance which will be derived
from the earlier literature.
The first two moments of w (under independence) are
E(w) —E[py) —AE[y) where A —E[p]
n
V(v) —V(E —AV[y] +A(Ey)2
i—i
The component of the variance of w which couldbe accounted for by
patent numbers corresponds to thelast term
Var (p-] —A2
anditsrelative size is given by
41Var (py]/Var [wJ —l/(l+V[yJ/E[y)2)—l/(l+r2)
where v is the coefficient of variation in the distribution of patent
values.
Turning to the literature for some order of magnitude estimates of
various parameters, we have estimates of the mean value of the news
associated with patents in the U.S. of between $200,000 (Griliches, 1981) and
$800,000 (Pakes, 1985) per patent. There is also some information on this
point in Criliches, Hall and Pakes: an estimate of $98,000 per unexpected
patent at the geometric mean of their data (with a very large standard error).
For the drug industry, where patents are more important, they get a larger and
somewhat more precise estimate: an $821,000 average increase in the value of
the firm per unexpected patent. This, in fact, is very similar to the Pakes
estimate which was based on a smaller sample of larger firms and is therefore
more comparable to their drug firms subset.
Taking the upper range of these numbers, $800,000 per "unexpected
patent, and using ) —13,the average (geometric) number of patents received
in the Criliches, Hall, Pakes sample (per year, per firm), the expected
contribution of the variance in patent numbers to the average variance in
market value is 13(0.8)2 (mil$)2 —$8.3millions squared. To get an
estimate of Var(y), I borrow the estimated coefficertt of variation of the
distribution of patent values from Pakes (1986) and Schankerman and Pakes
(l986)) Both these articles produced coefficients of variation on the
order of 2 to 3.6. Since we are looking for upper-bound estimates, taking
3.6 and applying it to the "upper" range estimate of Ey —$0.8million, gives
an estimate of the total variance of w as
13[(3.6x0.8)2 +(0.8)2]—$116million sq.
42This is to be compared to the average variance of qV .Thevariance of
q in the Criliches, Hall, Pakes sample is0.133 which, evaluated at the
geometric average value of their firms ($276 million), yields a varianceof
market value changes on the order of $10,000 million squared. Comparing the
two variances gives an estimate of the relative importance of fluctuations in
the market value of new patented innovations as at about one percent of the
total fluctuations in market value.15 That is, even if one had good estimates
of patent values, they would account for little of the fluctuations in market
value. Having numbers instead of values makes matters much worse, reducing
this fraction even further. The contribution of patent numbers to the
variance in their values is only on the order of 7 percent (1/(1 +(3.6)2)),
and their contribution to the explanation of the variance in the unexpected
changes in the market values of individual firms is muchsmaller (less than
0.1 percent).16 One should not, therefore, use data on stock market
fluctuations in this fashion to test detailed hypotheses about the information
content of patent statistics. On the other hand, whiletheestimated variance
components are rather small, they should not be interpreted asimplying that
the returns to inventive activity are small or that the topic we havebeen
pursuing is not interesting, only that we have been lookingfor our particular
needle in a very large haystack.
437. Spillovers and Other Uses of Patent Data
A major unresolved issue in the area of economics of technology isthe
identification and measurement of R&D spillovers, the benefits that one company
or industry receives from the R&D activity of another. Itis difficult to
trace such spillovers without having strong a priori notionsabout who are the
potential beneficiaries of whose research. (See Griliches, 1979, pp.102-5
for additional discussion of these issues.) One way to approach this
problem is to use the detailed information on patenting by typeof patent
(patent class) to cluster firms into common "technological activity"clusters
and looking whether a firm's variables are related to the overall activity
levels of its cluster.
In his thesis and several recent papers, Adam Jaffe (1983, 1985, 1986,
1988) has used firm level data on patenting by class of patent and on the
distribution of sales by 4-digit SIC to cluster firms into 21 distinct
technological clusters and 20 industry (sales orientation) clusters. It turns
out that these two criteria lead to different clusterings. Using the
technological clusters Jaffe constructed a measure of the total R&D "pool"
available for spillovers (borrowing or stealing) in a cluster. He then looked
at three "outcome" variables: R&D investment ratio for the firm (in 1976),
patents received (average number applied for during 1975-77), and output
growth, between 1972 and 1977. In each of these cases, his measure of the R&D
pool contributed significantly and positively to the explanation of the firm
level "outcome" variables even in the presence of industry dummies (based on
sales clustering). Not surprisingly, perhaps, firms in technological clusters
44with large overall R&D "pools" invested more intensively in R&D than would be
predicted just from their industrial (SIC) location. More interesting is the
finding that firms received more patents per R&D dollar in clusters where more
R&D was performed by others, again above and beyond any pure industry
differences (based on a classification of their sales). Similarly, his
analysis of firm productivitry growth during the 1972-77 period showed that it
was related positively to both the average R&D intensity of the individual
firms and the change in the size of the R&D pool available to these firms. In
terms of profits, or market value, there were, however, both positive and
negative effects of neighboring firms' R&D. The net effect was positive for
high R&D firms, but firms with R&D about one standard deviation below the mean
were made worse off overall by the R&D of others. Here the idea of R&D
spillovers is made operational by using the firm's patenting pattern to
construct a measure of its location in "technological space" and showing that
the R&D of others, weighted inversely to their distance from this location has
an observable impact on its own success. More recently, Jaffe (1989) hasused
regional data on patenting to investigate spillovers from academic research.
Patent documents contain also citations to other, previous, patents.
Following the growth of interest in citations in general and the development
of computer software which allows the search for all subsequent citations of a
particular patent (or article), there has been a growing interest in using
citations counts as alternative "indexes" of differential quality. It should
be noted here that patent citations differ from usual scientific citations to
the work of others in that that they are largely the contribution of patent
examiners whose task is to delimit the reach of the new patent and note the
context in which it is granted. In that sense, the "objectivity"of such
45citations is greater and may contribute to the validityof citation counts as
indexes of relative importance. But in another sense, theyare like citations
added at the insistence of the eaitor; they mayreflect the importance that is
put in the field on particular papersbut are not a valid indicator for
channels of influence, for intellectual spillovers. On theother hand, they
bring us closer to something that might be interpreted asmeasuring the social
rather than just the private returns to these patents.
The use of patent citations as "indicators" is discussed, largelyin a
bibliometric style, by Campbell and Nieves (1979), Carpenter etal (1981),
Carpenter and Narin (1983), and Narin et al (1987) (seealso the more general
discussion of bibliometric evidence in OTA, 1986, Chapter 3). An interesting
economic application is to be found in Trajtenberg (1987) who showsthat
citation weighted patent numbers are more closely correlated withhis "output"
measure, consumer surplus gains from the development anddiffusion of CAT-
scanners (computed tomography), while unweighted patent counts are more
closely related to "input," to &D expenditures by the variousfirms in this
field. (For another application of citation data see Lieberman, 1987). This
way of using patent data is only in its beginningsand we are likely to see a
much wider use of it in the future.
A number of studies have tried to "validate" patents as indicators of
technical change by connecting them to counts of innovations, new chemical
entities, and subsequent measures of profits or growth. Oneofthe earliest
and best studies of this kind, Comanor and Scherer (1969), related
pharmaceutical patents to the number of new chemical entities and all new
products introduced by the different firms in subsequent years and found
a closer relationship between patent applications (rather than grants) with
46all new products (rather than just the number of new chemical entities). I
will not consider in detail a number of studies which found varying degrees of
relationship between patents, "invention" or "innovation" counts, because the
subjectivity and elasticity of such innovation count data makes their results
very difficult to interpret. For examples of such work see Achilladelis et al
(1987), Basberg (1982), Kleinknecht (1982) and Walsh (1984). Scherer (1965)
shows a positive relationship between earlier patenting rates and subsequent
profitability and sales growth differences in a cross-section of firms, but I
know of no studies which relate "successfully" patenting rates or patenting
stocks to subsequent growth of productivity at the firm level.
Patent data have been used by Pavitt and Soete and their associates, to
analyze the relative "competitiveness" of various countries, to construct
"Revealed Technology Advantage" indexes for various countries, and to describe
and contrast the international location of inventive activity in different
industries. (Pavitt and Soete 1980. 1981, Pavitt 1982, Pavitt and Patel 1988,
and Soete 1987). Patents have been used by economic historians to study
regional patterns of economic growth and the externalities of population size
and agglomeration (Kelly 1972, Sokoloff 1988, and Sokoloff and Khan 1989, among
others). There have been also many other attempts to use patent data in
different areas of economic analysis. It is not possible, unfortunately, to
do justice to all of them here.
47FOOTNOTES
*Iam indebted to my friends and collaborators for manyideas and comments.
Parts of this survey borrow heavily (often verbatim) from ourearlier work on
this topic1 especially from Gri].iches, Pakes and Hall (1987),Griliches, Hall
and Pakes (1988) and Griliches (1989). I am indebted to theNational Science
Foundation (PRA8S-12758 and SES 82-08006) and the National Bureauof Economic
Research Productivity Program for financial support of this workand to B.
Hall, A. Pakes, K. Pavitt, M. Schankerman, and F.M. Schererfor their comments
on an earlier draft. The first draft of this survey was begunwhile I was a
guest of the Rockefeller Foundation at the Sellagio Studyand Conference
Center in Italy. An earlier version of this paper was presented asthe W.S.
Woytinsky Lecture of 1989 at the University of Michigan.
I. There are several other good surveys on this range of topics. See
especially Basberg (1987), Pavitt (1978 and 1985), Pakes and Simpson (1989),
Schankerman (1989), and the earlier books by Schmookler (1966) and Taylor
and Silberston (1973).
2. This is especially true of some of the European work on related topics,
since it often asks somewhat different questions in a different intellectual
framework.
3. See OTAF 1985, the proceedings of the conference on the concordance, for a
more detailed discussion of some of these issues.
4. Of course, one need not start here. It is a particularly American view,
1which finds thinking in terms of a "production function of knowledge"
congenial and useful, and looks for patents to serve as a proxy for the
"output" of this process. Less "neo-classically" oriented economists would
deny the usefulness of this view or the uniform direction of causality thatit
implicitly espouses.
5. This conclusion depends on the additive nature of the error in the
indicator function. If K were to be looked at just as an aggregation of
inventive events, each with a potential value of its own, drawn independently
from some value distribution, and P counted only some fraction of such
events and was not related to their values, (as in the calculations outlined
in Section 6), then the above inequalities would not hold anymore. If,onthe
other hand, the patenting decision itself were a function of the size of the
expected gain from the invention, as noted in the text, then thesituation
would be somewhere in between.
6. To the extent that some patents arise in the development stage, theywould
also be related to R&D with only a short lag.
7. Sirrilli (1987) shows that in small firms in Italy (less than100
employees) over a third of the inventors (36 percent) come from production
and quality and control activities, while in the large firms (employees>1000)
only11 percent of the inventors come from this category. Theproportion of
patentsoriginating in formal R&D risesfrom39 percent in small firmsto 63
percentinthe large ones with therest (25 and 26 percent) being in the more
ambigious "design" category. Similar conclusions canalso be infered from
Kleinknecht (1989), whoreportsa significant underestimate of R&D activities
2in small firms by the conventionaldata collection methodology.
8. See Jensen 1987 for similar results usingnew chemical entities rather
than patents. For contradictor)' evidence, usingother measures, see Scherer
1985b, Chapter 11 and Acs and Audretsch,1989.
9. Based on unpublished tabluations of theOffice of Documentation
Information at the U.S. Patent Office.
10. See Pakes and Simpson 1989 and Schankerman,1989 and 1990 for an extension
of these results and Trajtenberg 1988 for anotherapproach to the same problem.
11. This equation would hold exactly in a worldin which all assets were fully
traded in the same market. More generally, such an equationis valid in a
multi-capital setting only under very stringentconditions, such as the
linear-homogeneitY of the profit function. See Wildasin(1984) and Hayashi and
Inous (1989) for more discussion.
12. See Hall 1989, Chapter 2, for similar results.
13. This is, of course, related to Schaookler's distinctionbetween patents
classified by industry of origin versus industry of use."Who Does the
invention" depends more on supply considerations "For whom the invention is
doneTM is more likely to be affected by demand shifts.
14. Theyestimate thevalue of the patent rights. I assumethat the value of
th. underlying innovation isproportionaltoitspatent right value and highly
correlatedto it.
315. There are two major problems in using this procedure to estimate the
variance of the news in the economic value of patents held by the firm: the
first is that the distribution estimated by Schankerman and Pakes is a
distribution of the value of patent rights, which may vary less than
proportionally with the true economic valueof the associated invention tothe
firm. The second problem probably goes in the other direction: some of the
change in the firm's patent value this year may not be news, andthus may have
already been incorporated into the market value at the beginningof the year.
Allowing for some predictability of patent numbers would only reducesuch
fractions futher, multiplying them essentially byl-R2 of the prediction
equation. (See Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1990) for a moredetailed discussion
of this and related issues.)
16. An alternative approach to this question is developed in Griliches,Hall
and Pakes by modelling the components of variance in stock market value
surprises explicitly as functions of current and past patentingand R&D
activity, allowing one to estimate also the contributionof revisions in past
patents values to current changes in marketvalue. Though the resulting
estimates are rather imprecise, since they are based essentially onfourth
moments of the data, they do imply that the variance inthe news about the
value of patents (current and past) could account for about five percentof
the total variance in market value surprises, a number which maylook low but
is actually a number as high as any that have been found inother studies of
market value revisions. Only about one-fifth of this, however, canbe
attributed to news associated with current patent applications.
4Table 1
Selectivity of Firms in 1976 Cross-Section
by Size of Employment
Employment Number of firmsa Number of firms b
Ratio
in cross-section in Census of Enterprises
<10 24 16,000 .0015
10-99 301 14,300 .021
100-999 952 9,000 .106
1000 + 1267 1,900 .667
Total 2541 41,200 .062
a Withgood employment data. Computed from the data used in Bound etal
(1984).
b comparable manufacturing industries. From U.S. Bureau of the Census,
EnterDrise Statistics nfl,GeneralReport on Industrial Organization, Table
3, pp. 152-198.Table 2
The Stock Market's Relative %luatian ofR&Dand Patents
Dependent Variable: log (q)







R2 0.027 0.125 0.258
V —marketvalue of the firm
A —Totalnet assets at replacement cost
Q— V
K —"Stock"of R&D using 15 percent depreciation rate
MR —"Newsin R&D": Current R&D less depreciation of the R&D stock
SP —"Stock"of Patents using 30 percent depreciation rate
N —722.Mean of the dependent variable —-0.272,standard deviation —0.697.
HeteroscedasticitY.Conststent standard errors in parentheses.
Matched by IND, 1980 Data.
All equ.ations also contain an intercept term and the logarithmof Assets,
whose coefficient wassmall but consistentlysignificant, on the order of
.0.03 (0.01).
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Renewal Costs and Renewal Proportions
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From Schankerman and Pakes, 1986, Figures 2 and 3